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Spain has been one of the hardest hit countries by the COVID-19 pandemic, and this crisis
presented a window of opportunity for VOX, as it has for other far right parties, to raise its
visibility as opposition force. This paper investigates whether the discourse of VOX has
evolved during the pandemic and affected the political dynamics in Spain. This article
proposes a new multidimensional strategy to measure the degree of populism in political
communications, via quantitative and qualitative content analysis. It dissects the
parliamentary speeches of the leader of VOX, Santiago Abascal, in the debates for the
approval and extension of the “state of alarm” to fight against COVID-19 between March
and June 2020. In order to assess the changes and relative intensity of populist features in
Abascal’s parliamentary speeches we compared them with his speech during Pedro
Sánchez’s investiture session as the Spanish President of the Government, in January
2020, and VOX’s latest political manifestos—2019 European and Spanish General
Elections—, as well as with speeches of the representatives of the five main parties
and coalitions during the COVID-19 debates in the Spanish Congress.Our paper shows
that populists’ discourses are context-dependent and that their performances are not only
shaped by crisis but also constitutive of crisis. The density of populist references in
Abascal’s speeches grew steadily during the period analysed. Morality and antagonism
overshadowed sovereignty and society as key populist attributes, and the tone of the
discourse became increasingly hyperbolic. Moreover, Abascal’s discursive performances
had a sort of contagion effect in other parties in the parliamentary sessions studied.
People’s Party (Partido Popular–PP) leader Pablo Casado chose to follow VOX and harshly
criticized the government, meanwhile the discourses of the speakers of Together We Can
(Unidas Podemos–UP) and Catalan Republican Left (Esquerra Republicana de
Catalunya–ERC), adopted a demonizing rhetoric against VOX and PP also grounded
on a populist logic of articulation. This polarizing dynamic between competing Manichean
discourses contributed to reinforce the sense of crisis by adding a political dimension to the
already existing health and economic problems.
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the worst health crises in
recent history and a major challenge for governments around the
world, most of which failed to stop the spread of the virus. The
efforts to curb this pandemic using social confinement measures
reduced civil liberties, eroded social capital and brought about
economic insecurity (Fetzer et al., 2020). Although there are
already several studies exploring the political consequences of the
COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., Bol et al., 2020; Santana et al., 2020;
Bobba and Hubé, 2021; Jungkuntz, 2021), the analysis of the
impact of this crisis on the discourse of populist parties and
leaders is still in its infancy.1
This article tries to shed some light on the interaction between
populism and crisis by applying a content analysis methodology
(Bauer, 2000) to the parliamentary speeches of Santiago Abascal,
the leader of the Spanish populist radical right party VOX
(Turnbull Dugarte et al., 2020; Rama et al., 2021), during the
first wave of the pandemic. The choice of VOX as a case study to
test the effect of COVID-19 on the populist message can be
explained by two main reasons. First, VOX is a party that has
experienced a recent surge in popularity becoming the third
largest party in the Spanish Congress of Deputies—with over
15 per cent of the votes—which constitutes a remarkable
evolution for a far-right party in the current context (Mudde,
2019). Second, Spain was one of the countries hardest hit by the
COVID-19 pandemic suffering an excess of 78,724 deaths from
March 10, 2020 to January 31, 2021 (MoMo, 2021) and a Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) fall of 11% in 2020 (INE, 2021).
Interestingly, the Spanish Government which initially
downplayed the dangers of the pandemic allowing a multitude
of mass gathering and demonstrations to take place in early
March, decided that the rapid growth of the virus required
decisive action. Thus, on March 14, 2020 the Spanish
Government decreed the “state of alarm” (La Moncloa, 2020)
and implemented one of the strictest lockdowns around the
world. In this sense, we wanted to analyse whether that critical
juncture was seized as an opportunity by VOX to adapt its
discourse.
This article proposes a new strategy to measure degrees of
populism combining quantitative and qualitative content analysis
of political communications (Drisko and Maschi, 2016). It
compares the density of populist features across five
dimensions in which we dissect populism: 1) antagonistic
depiction of the polity, 2) moral interpretation of the people,
3) idealised construction of society, 4) popular sovereignty, and 5)
reliance on charismatic leadership (Olivas Osuna, 2021). We
want to shed light on how crises such as the COVID-19
pandemic, shape and are shaped by populist rhetoric. We
approach the concept of crisis not only as a moment but also
as a process of transformation (Hay, 1996: 254–255) and
investigate if populist discursive performances framing the
COVID-19 crisis propagated beyond populist parties (Moffit,
2015; Panizza and Stavrakakis, 2021). We systematically analyze
two political manifestos and seven parliamentary speeches of
VOX as well as ten other speeches corresponding to five different
parliamentary groups during the debates that took place to
approve the extension of the state of alarm during the first
wave of the COVID-19 pandemic between March and June 2020.
Although we find that the leader of VOX is the politician that
employed a more confrontational tone and a higher density of
populist allusions, several of the speeches of the other parties also
reflected relatively high levels of populism in these debates. Our
study indicates that the evolution of the discourses of the leader of
VOX impacted the speeches of other parties in parliamentary
debates on the COVID-19. While the leader of PP, Pablo Casado,
began to imitate the hyperbolic and confrontational rhetoric of
VOX against the Government, other speakers took advantage of
Abascal’s controversial claims to discredit VOX, by relying as well
on a populist style. We observe, throughout the parliamentary
debates analyzed, a significant increase in the density and tone of
discursive allusions based on two of the dimensions of
populism—antagonism and morality—, but a low presence of
the other three—idealization of society, popular sovereignty and
personalistic leadership.
We divide the article in five sections. In the literature review,
we briefly outline different conceptualization of populism and
why it is important to study this phenomenon against the
background of major crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
Next, we explain the choice of VOX as a case study. The third
section explains the methodology and data used. Then, we discuss
the main results issued from the quantitative and qualitative
analyses. Finally, we draw some conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW: POPULISM, CRISES
AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
Disagreements regarding the conceptualization and
operationalization of populism have been frequent in this area
of study since its inception (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969). While
some experts define populism as a “thin-centered ideology”
(Mudde, 2004), others present it as political strategy employed
by personalist leaders to reach or exercise power (Weyland, 2001:
14), or focus on the discursive (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007) and
performative nature of the phenomenon (Ostiguy, 2009). These
different approaches reflect meaningful theoretical discrepancies
but are not incompatible. They largely recognize a similar core of
populist attributes, such as Manichean interpretation of society,
anti-elitism, people-centrism, and moralism (Olivas Osuna, 2021:
5–7). Strategies, discourses, and styles are usually grounded on
ideological traits. Populist expressions either reflect beliefs and
perceptions of the political leaders that make them or try to
connect with the worldview of the people they seek to influence.
However, from an empirical research perspective it is easier to
make inferences based on the analysis of discourses or other
forms of populist expression, than studying the ideology or
1Wondreys and Mudde (2021) who analyze the effects of COVID-19 on twenty-
seven far-right parties, and the collaborative report edited by Katsambekis and
Stavrakakis (2021) that compares the strategies of populist parties in sixteen
countries are among the few works that study the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic on populist communication.
Frontiers in Political Science | www.frontiersin.org June 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 6785262
Olivas and Rama COVID-19: A Political Virus?
political strategies that underpin them. In fact, the differences
between “thin-centered ideology” and “discourse” are minor and
irrelevant to many research questions (Mudde and Rovira-
Kaltwasser, 2018: 1669) and proponents of the ideational
approach often use these terms as interchangeable in their
comparative work (Hawkins and Rovira-Kaltwasser, 2017:
514). Studying populism via the analysis of political
communications is relevant, not only because populist
discourses can be considered as a reflection of an underlying
ideology (Hawkins et al., 2012: 3) but also because they contribute
to construct populist ideas (de Vreese et al., 2018: 425).
Although ideational factors are considered key determinants
of populist discourses (Hawkins et al., 2019b), we cannot assume
a deterministic relationship between the two. Non-populist
leaders use sometimes populist rhetoric and populist leaders
may display different levels of populism depending on the
issue, audience, and specific circumstances. Indeed, populist
communication can be construed as a context dependent
strategy (Hawkins et al., 2019a; De Bruycker and Rooduijn,
2021). This idea is compatible with the performative
conceptualization of populism as a relational appeal that is
more effective in certain social contexts (Ostiguy et al., 2021: 8).
The analysis of populist discourses through great events such
the COVID-19 pandemic can help understand how populist
leaders adapt their communicative style to take advantage of
changing circumstances. Many studies show that populist
movements usually appear within a crisis context (Laclau,
2005: 139, 177; Stavrakakis et al., 2018: 7). For instance, neo-
liberal populist leaders in Latin America emerged in response to
hyperinflationary crises in the late 1980s (Weyland, 2003) and the
more recent Global Financial Crisis propelled many European
populist parties (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). Populism thrives in
periods of political, social and economic crisis because crisis
erodes trust on political representative, fuels grievances, and
serves as a justification for radical measures (Roberts, 2015;
Brubaker, 2020a: 7–8). Disagreements on how to respond to
major crises can also contribute to polarize the society and create
a fertile ground for protest parties and personalistic leaders who
articulate a persuasive solution out of it.
But crisis is not simply a trigger or a facilitating condition
for populism, crises are also discursively (re)constructed by
populist discontent and blame narratives. Populists
spectacularize social, political and economic problems—as
well as the failure to address them—to propagate the sense
of crisis and turn “the people” against a dangerous “other”
(Moffitt, 2015: 210). Therefore, the performances of crises can
be construed as central features of the populist phenomenon
itself (Moffit, 2015). These performances are not only staged
by populist leaders but also by others who compete with them
in the discursive construction of the crisis (Stavrakakis et al.,
2018: 9; Hay, 1996). Crisis discourses by populist leaders
present simplistic solutions on behalf of “the people” while
blaming some “nefarious other”. These are far from
inconsequential as usually elicit similarly simplistic and
confrontational responses from political adversaries
(Stavrakakis, 2014). This emerging relationship of mutual
antagonism often leads to a culture of political polarization
and becomes part of the process of constitution, or
reinforcement, of collective political identities based on
emotional appeals and affective investments (Panizza and
Stavrakakis, 2021: 27–28). Hence the relevance of studying
populist discourses within the context of crisis, such as the
coronavirus one.
The COVID-19 pandemic has heightened the expression of
several populist attitudinal traits, such as distrust in expert
advice, skepticism toward elite overprotectiveness, and
antipathy against government regulation (Brubaker, 2020a:
10). This crisis has created not only health and economic
problems but also serious democratic challenges. In Spain, the
COVID-19 crisis has induced greater demands for techno-
authoritarian decision-making strong leadership, willingness
to give up individual freedom (Amat et al., 2020), and support
for the idea of recentralization of devolved powers
(Garmendia and Alfonso, 2020). All these ideas resonate
with the discourse of VOX, which is also the party that
Spaniards with anti-democratic views are more prone to
support (Rama et al., 2021). VOX is, therefore, a party that
could take advantage of the changes in public attitudes
triggered by this health crisis. Indeed, recent opinion polls2
and the results in the regional elections in Catalonia in
February 2021 confirm that VOX support is currently
experiencing an upward trend. In this paper we try to
understand how this party shaped its communications to
be able to take advantage of the political conjuncture and
whether VOX approach to the crisis impacted the discourses
of other parties.
VOX AS A CASE STUDY
Despite the severe impacts of the 2008 Great Recession,
Spain remained one of the few European countries without
a major populist radical right party (PRRP). However,
Spain’s exceptionalism (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser,
2015) came to an end in December 2018 when VOX
gained electoral representation in the regional
parliamentary elections of Andalusia, which spurred it
onto further electoral successes at the national level in
April 2019 general election, when the party obtained
more than 10 per cent of the votes and 24 out of 350
seats. The unsuccessful attempts to create a government
led to the repetition of the elections. On November 10,
2019, VOX increased in more than 5 percentual points their
votes, coming out as the third largest party with 52 seats.
VOX case deserves special attention as it has managed to make
its electoral support grow very rapidly in a relatively very short
period becoming one of the most successfully far right parties in
Western Europe (Mudde, 2019). Economically, the party
promotes a focus on market liberalism and reduced state
2See the mean of polls at El Electoral. Encuesta Media (2021) https://elelectoral.
com/encuesta-media/that estimates that, on March 1, 2021, VOX support is 16.9%
(vs 15.1% obtained in the last General Election on November 10, 2019).
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intervention, diverging from other PRRPs which can be
associated with the so-called welfare-chauvinism (Greve, 2019)
such as the French Rassemblement National, the Hungarian
Jobbik or the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) (González Cuevas,
2019; Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2020). VOX was initially formally
presented as a “liberal center-right party” and founded by three
former members of the center-right conservative People’s Party
[Partido Popular] (PP), Alejo Vidal-Quadras, Santiago Abascal
and José Antonio Ortega Lara. However, the party gradually
moved from a traditional conservative nationalist discourse into
more radical positions and displayed often nativist, authoritarian
and populist traits as other PRRPs (Mudde, 2010).
VOX defends a traditionalist Christian conception of Spanish
society with frequent references to the threat of Islam. For
example, in its general election manifesto, VOX proposes to
“close fundamentalist mosques and expel imams that spread
fundamentalism”, “exclusion of teaching about Islam in public
schools” (VOX, 2019: 7) and “setting up an agency to help
threatened Christian minorities, imitating a similar initiative in
Hungary” (VOX, 2019b: 23). VOX opposes same sex marriage,
requests protection for the “natural family”, and pledges to
reform abortion laws to make them more stringent (VOX,
2019b: 17–18). VOX also opposes what they call “gender
ideology” and feminism (VOX, 2020). and claims that
“subsidized radical feminist organizations” should be
suppressed (VOX, 2019b: 17). In line with other radical right-
wing parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008), VOX displays a clearly anti-
immigration rhetoric (Vampa, 2020). For instance, they call for
“deportation of illegal immigrants to their countries of origin”,
new requirements and barriers for nationality and establishing
quotas based on linguistic and cultural criteria (VOX,
2019b: 5–6).
VOX explicitly opposes multiculturalism (VOX, 2019a: 3,
9) constructs narratives that selectively mystify periods of
history to redefine what constitutes “the people” and exclude
the “other” (Manucci, 2019). For example, the leaders of VOX
use the Spanish Reconquista as a symbol to associate Spanish
identity to Christianism, and to portray Muslim populations
as alien to Spanish culture. VOX also divides society in two
blocs: “the living Spain” (la España viva) and “the anti-Spain”
(la anti-España).3 The latter refers left-wing and secessionist
parties and is a concept already used by Spanish nationalists in
the 30s and by Francoism. VOX uses a selective anti-elitism as
it does not usually launch general attacks against economic or
political elites but focuses its recriminations on progressive
media and left-wing politicians.
Additionally, VOX is characterized by its support for a unitary
and centralized Spain where the current Autonomous
Communities’ parliaments and governments would be
disbanded and all secessionist parties banned (VOX, 2019b:
2–3; González Cuevas, 2019: 2–3). VOX has capitalized on the
disproportionate share of media attention received (Olalla
Ubierna et al., 2019) as well as on the unrest generated by the
political and social conflict in Catalonia and the discontent of part
of the electorate with Spanish decentralized model (Turnbull-
Dugarte, 2019).
Finally, it is worth noting that influenced by American radical
right (Turnbull-Dugarte and Rama, 2021),4 VOX growing
electoral success has been accompanied by changes in their
agenda and communication style. VOX’s leaders have adopted
since 2019 anti-globalist arguments attacking supranational
organizations and using conspiracy theories, such as blaming
George Soros of orchestrating mass immigration in Europe.5 In
2020, the party also used the COVID-19 pandemic to gain
visibility and reinforce the antagonistic and moral tone against
the Government and most other political parties. VOX organized
anti-government protests, both in May and in October 2020,
encouraging citizens to use their vehicles and thereby circumvent
the lockdown rules.6 When the majority of parties attempted to
show unity in the fight against the pandemic, they voted against
successive extensions for the state of alarm,7 called a vote of no
confidence against the government and propagated conspiracy
theories. For instance, Abascal accused the Spanish government
of “euthanizing” thousands of elderly people,8 blamed China for
creating and propagating virus purposefully,9 and insinuated that
the World Health Organization (WHO) is manipulated by the
Asian superpower.10
In this crisis context, VOX intensified its anti-European and
anti-immigration discourse, which seems to bring them closer to
other European PRRPs. For example, in Madrid City Hall, VOX
proposed measures to slow down immigration arguing that
migrants are more likely to carry coronavirus.11 Although
there is plenty of anecdotal evidence suggesting an escalation
3EL País. 12 april 2019. Abascal desentierra la “anti-España” para descalificar a la
izquierdahttps://elpais.com/politica/2019/04/26/actualidad/1556295390_562559.
html
4The Independent. 11 January 2019. Vox: Who are the Trump-inspired far-right
Spanish nationalist party and what do they stand for? https://www.independent.co.
uk/news/world/europe/vox-andalusia-santiago-abascal-spain-steve-bannon-donald-
trump-a8723121.html.
5Foreign Policy. 27 april 2019. Make Spain Great Again. https://foreignpolicy.com/
2019/04/27/vox-spain-elections-trump-bannon/
6La República. 11May 2020. “Vox llama amanifestarse el 23 de mayo saltándose las
restricciones del estado de alarma” https://www.republica.com/2020/05/11/vox-
llama-a-manifestarse-el-23-de-mayo-saltandose-las-restricciones-del-estado-de-
alarma/; Vozpópuli. 7 October 2020. “Vox llama a manifestarse en coche el
próximo lunes contra la ‘incompetencia’ del Gobierno”. https://www.vozpopuli.
com/espana/vox-manifestacion-fiesta_0_1399360820.html
7Out of all seven extensions to the state of alarm that the Government had to put to
a vote in the Congress, VOX only voted in favor the first time, voting against it the
other six times (just like most of the regionalist/independent parties such as ERC,
JxCat or Bildu). See: https://www.diariovasco.com/politica/seis-prorrogas-estado-
alarma-20200602144255-ntrc.html
8ELMundo, 13 april 2020. “Vox acusa al Gobierno de aplicar la eutanasia "por la vía
de los hechos" en las residencias de mayores”. https://www.elmundo.es/espana/
2020/04/13/5e944cddfdddffdbbd8b45b7.html
9Europapress, 21 October 2020. “Abascal insiste en el "virus chino": ‘China tiene
que pagar’" https://www.europapress.es/videos/video-abascal-insiste-virus-chino-
china-tiene-pagar-20201021122400.html
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of VOX′ populist rhetoric during the COVID-19 pandemic
(Magre et al., 2021), in this paper we systematically analyze
Abascal’s speeches in parliamentary sessions debating the
extension of the state of alarm to provide a more rigorous
comparative account of this evolution.
METHODOLOGY
This paper follows the suggestion made by de Vreese et al.
(2018) to approach the study populism as a communication
phenomenon and tries to test whether context shapes
populists’ claims and discursive style by analysing
parliamentary speeches of the leader of VOX, Santiago
Abascal, and the potential spill-over effects on other
Spanish parties. The relation between political actors and
the world is mediated or constructed by language, in the
form of speech and texts. Through the analysis of political
communications populist ideologies and discourses may be
identified empirically (Kriesi, 2014: 364). The use of content
analysis is not new to the study of populism (e.g., Hawkins,
2009; Koopmans and Muis, 2009; Aslanidis, 2018; Bernhard
and Kriesi, 2019). This methodology intends to produce
quantifiable evidence about a set of categories by a
systematic analysis of a set of texts (Krippendorff, 1980: 21;
Weber, 1985: 9; Bryman 2016: 284).
As we seek to understand the characteristics and evolution
of populist communication during the COVID-19 crisis, we
analyze all the interventions of the leader of VOX, Santiago
Abascal, in the Spanish Congress debates concerning the six
successive extensions of the “state of alarm” declared by the
Royal Decree 463/2020 of March 14. These debates took place
every two weeks in plenary sessions from March 25 to June 3,
2020 (see Table 1). These sessions were selected given their
public relevance and their focus on the topic of the pandemic
governance.12 We retrieved the transcripts of Abascal’s
interventions from the official website of the Spanish
Congress of Deputies13. In this paper we test if the health
and economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic
impacted the discourse of VOX and other populist and non-
populist parties in the Spain.
To identify changes vis-à-vis previous periods, we also
examine, using the same content analysis methodology, the
two previous electoral manifestos of VOX, May 2019 for
European Parliament Elections (VOX, 2019a) and Spanish
Election in November 2019 (VOX, 2019b), as well as Abascal’s
parliamentary speech during Pedro Sánchez investiture session in
January 2020.14 Additionally, we compare the degrees of
populism of his speeches with those of the other main five
parliamentary groups–Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
[Partido Socialista Obrero Español] (PSOE), People’s Party
[Partido Popular] (PP), Together We Can [Unidas Podemos]
(UP) and Citizens [Ciudadanos] (Cs), and Catalan Republican
Left [Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya] (ERC)–during the first
COVID-19 debate, on March 25, 2020, and on the last one, on
June 3, 2020. The analysis of the speeches of other populists—UP
TABLE 1 | Summary of texts analyzed and density of populist and anti-populist features.










Manifesto May 2019 VOX 8,123 15 1.85 62 7.63
Manifesto Nov 2019 VOX 3,504 3 0.86 30 8.56
Speech January 4, 2020 Abascal (VOX) 5,043 0 0.00 101 20.03
Speech March 25, 2020 Abascal (VOX) 3,283 5 1.52 44 13.40
Speech April 9, 2020 Abascal (VOX) 3,574 3 0.84 50 13.99
Speech April 22, 2020 Abascal (VOX) 3,638 4 1.09 62 17.04
Speech May 6, 2020 Abascal (VOX) 4,203 5 1.19 76 18.08
Speech May 20, 2020 Abascal (VOX) 3,969 0 0.00 87 21.92
Speech June 3, 2020 Abascal (VOX) 3,931 2 0.50 103 26.20
Speech March 25, 2020 Casado (PP) 4,007 22 5.49 26 6.49
Speech June 3, 2020 Casado (PP) 3,678 1 0.27 75 20.40
Speech March 25, 2020 Bal (Cs) 2,364 7 2.97 6 2.54
Speech June 3, 2020 Muñoz (Cs) 3,286 19 5.78 9 2.73
Speech March 25, 2020 Sánchez
(PSOE)
7,506 42 5.59 5 0.66
Speech June 3, 2020 Sánchez
(PSOE)
18,542 65 3.50 32 1.73
Speech March 25, 2020 Romero (UP) 1,081 2 1.86 13 12.03
Speech June 3, 2020 Asens (UP) 3,400 3 0.88 36 10.59
Speech March 25, 2020 Rufián (ERC) 2,575 2 0.68 14 5.44
Speech June 3, 2020 Rufián (ERC) 2,679 0 0.00 48 17.93
12Although we refer in our analysis two six speeches, each of them includes two
interventions, as speakers have the right to respond to comments.
13Congreso de los Diputados (2020), Intervenciones.https://www.congreso.es/web/
guest/busqueda-de-intervenciones
14The investiture session in Spanish politics is very significant as political leaders
usually reflect the type of opposition are going to adopt and the policy issues, they
consider a priority.
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and ERC—and non-populist parties—PSOE, Cs, PP—15 serves to
contextualize the degree and nature of the discourse of the leader of
VOX. Moreover, this choice responds to the call for studying in
parallel not only populist discourses but also the discourses against
these parties elicited as a reaction (Stavrakakis et al., 2018, Panizza
and Stavrakakis, 2021: 27). By including other parties in our
research, we can also understand better the relational
component of populism (Ostiguy, 2017) and how competing
performances of crisis may diverge or converge. Thus, firstly,
we undertake a basic content analysis to provide a systematic
quantitative description of the communications selected (Drisko
andMaschi, 2016: 1) and establish comparisons of the evolution of
the discourses of VOX and the other political parties during the
first wave of COVID-19 pandemic. We use MAXQDA software to
assist our coding work, given that it facilitates navigating the coded
segments, analysing intersections of codes, and generating visual
representations with analytical value. Then, we carry out a
qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2004) on the coded text
to better understand the recurrent themes and tones. We include
some quotes and figures to support our arguments.16
This paper follows the coding framework and methodology
suggested for the study of populism by Olivas Osuna (2021) that
dissects this phenomenon in the following five dimensions (see
also Table 2):
(1) Antagonism: the antithetical depiction of “the people”
vs. “the other” is a core feature in most conceptualizations
of populism (Laclau, 2005). Political opponents are usually
turned into enemies (Panizza 2005). Populism is
considered as a sort of reaction or negativism against
the political and economic elites. Sometimes this
Manichean distinction opposes the “ordinary people” to
foreigners, migrants, ethnic or religious groups (Canovan,
1981: 294; Bonikowski, 2017: 184–185). Populist
movements tend to favor swift action and radical change,
adopting strong anti-status quo and anti-establishment
rhetoric (Panizza, 2005: 3–4; Moffit, 2016: 45).
(2) Morality: populism entails a moral or normative
interpretation of society, usually “the virtuous people” are
opposed to “the corrupt elite”, “deviants” or “undeserving
others” (Mudde, 2004: 543; Brubaker, 2020b: 54). Populist
movements tend to establish a moral hierarchy among
political players, claiming a higher moral ground and
delegitimizing political opponents (Tanguieff, 1984:
118). Ad hominem arguments aiming to arouse
prejudice, pity, or anger to undermine the legitimacy
of political opponents are very common. Those who
oppose the ideas of populist are often vilified or treated
as traitors to the people (Müller, 2017: 593).
(3) Idealization of society: populist tend to rely on an
ahistorical and anti-pluralist idealization of society, to
TABLE 2 | Summary of populist and anti-populist features coded.
Populist features Anti-populist features
Depiction of the
polity
Dual and antagonistic description of polity: “us” vs “them”, “the people” vs
“the elite” or ‘the other’ (migrants, minorities, intellectuals, etc.).
Complex and nuanced (non-antagonistic) depiction of the polity.
Endorsement or approval of political, legal and economic establishment.
Claims for gradual change.
Rejection of political, legal and/or economic establishment. Claims for
radical change. Confrontational tone, militaristic terms.
References to working together with political opponents and reaching
agreements.
Morality Moral interpretation of actors. Moral distinction and hierarchy (superiority
and inferiority). Claims against the legitimacy of the other actors.
Victimisation/blame discourses.
Political actors are not classified according to their moral standing. The
legitimacy of political opponents and their ideas is acknowledged.
Ad-hominem critiques and negative emotions. References to ill-
intentioned, unfair, or immoral behaviour or political opponents.
Critiques not focused on the proponent’s personal attributes or motives




Idealisation of society. Anti-pluralist depiction of “the people” focused on
identity, nationhood and/or ahistorical “heartland”. References to unity and
singularity, hyperbolic descriptions.
Complex and nuanced depiction of society and history. Pluralist portrayal
of the people. References to diversity of views and interests. Utilisation of
empirical data to back claims.
Emphasis on difference with “the other” and in-group homogeneity.
Exclusionary claims. Emotional language.
Emphasis on commonalities with “the other” and in-group heterogeneity.
Recognition of a common space. Inclusive claims
Sovereignty Absence of limits to popular sovereignty. Majoritarian logic. The ‘will of the
people’ is expected to prevail over laws, minority rights and institutions.
Popular sovereignty limited by laws and formal rights. Emphasis on
representative democratic tools. Complexity in decision-making is
acknowledged.
Preference for direct democracy tools. Praise of referendums, public
consultations, and mass mobilisations.
References the protection of minority rights and interests and to
institutional and legal checks on the will of the majority.
Leadership Leaders voice “the will of the people” and represent their interests. Non-
mediated relation with the people. Leaders are described as more
important than political parties.
Leaders’ relations with people is mediated by institutions. Political parties
represent people’s interests. Parties and other institutions are expected to
control and be heard by political leaders.
Focus on the actions, decisions, and ideas of leaders. Idealisation of their
achievements. Charisma takes precedence over expertise.
Focus on the actions, decisions and ideas of political parties and
institutions, not simply those of individuals.
Source: Olivas Osuna (2021).
15According to the Global Party Survey the scores in Populist Rhetoric for these
parties are the following: VOX: 9.16; ERC: 7.53; UP: 7.29; CS: 3.7; PP: three; PSOE:
2.5 (Norris, 2020).
16The MAXQDA file with the codes and coded segments is publicly available for
replication purpose at Harvard database: doi: 10.7910/DVN/LCEAZP
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construct a somewhat homogenous collective identity
(Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2004). Differences between in-
groups are downplayed and differences with out-groups
exacerbated in populist discourses. The dissonance
between the “ideal people” and the “actual people” in a
society makes often populist to request the extraction or
exclusion of part of the people (Müller, 2014).
(4) Popular sovereignty: the populist conception of
sovereignty suggests that the “will of the people” or
the “will of the majority” should not be bounded by legal
or political institutions, and that the people should have
an unmediated relationship with the government (Shils,
1956: 98–104). This majoritarian interpretation derives
of the suspicion that institutions and laws have been
designed by the elites. It also resonates with a preference
for direct democracy tools such as referendums, popular
assemblies, and mass mobilizations.
(5) Personalistic leadership: Populist movements often
emerge when charismatic leaders mobilise and receive
support from a large and uninstitutionalized mass of
people (Weyland, 2001: 4–18). These leaders are capable
of discerning and articulating the “will of the people”
(Kriesi, 2014: 363, Müller, 2016: 32–38). Thus, populist
often consider than the relationship of the leader and
their supporters does not need to be mediated by parties,
parliaments, or other institutions.
Departing from a classical categorization stance (Sartori,
1970) this study does not consider any of the above dimensions
as necessary conditions. Following an approach closer to
Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances” and Lakoff’s “radial
structure” (Lakoff, 1987: 16–20, 83–84; Collier and Mahon,
1993: 848–850), we assume that not all populists need to share
all defining attributes of populism. Dimensions may appear in
different degrees depending on the specific communication and
wider political context, as well as depending on the type of populist
movement. It is worth noting that in this paper we do not intend
to classify parties or discourses as “populists” or “non-populists”
as that would entail setting thresholds and minimal necessary
conditions. When we refer to populist parties, we do it based on
previous classifications. As other recent empirical studies on the
supply side (e.g., Bernhard and Kriesi, 2019; Meijers and Zaslove,
2020; Norris, 2020), this article treats populism in a continuous
manner. The core metric used in the quantitative analysis is the
density of populist references in each of the abovementioned
dimensions (number of references per 1,000 words).
We code not only the populist references encountered in the
transcriptions of the speeches and manifestos but also the “anti-
populist” features encountered in the texts. These act as “negative
poles” (Goetz, 2006: 27–35) and provide additional elements for
comparison. The anti-populist category indicate a “pluralist” or
“liberal democratic” stance.17 Sentences were analyzed and
allocated to the corresponding populist and anti-populist
codes, using several of them when appropiate. Other codes
informed by the literature on populism, such as references to
disinformation, religion, territorial issues, anti-gender views,
traditional values, punitiveness, state intervention, and
economic liberalism, were also recorded to provide a richer
picture of the recurrent ideas used in the articulation of VOX’
discourses.
RESULTS
The results of our analysis show how VOX’s discourse is modulated
and evolved during the first wave of the pandemic (Figure 1). We
observe significant changes vis-à-vis VOX’s 2019 political manifestos
in terms of mix of populist discursive attributes. The idealized
depiction of society loses relevance, whereas the moral and
antagonistic dimensions largely increase their salience. These were
already the two dominant dimensions in the January investiture
speech (see second bar chart, first row, in Figure 1) but during the
pandemic the populist references to society are reduced and themoral
component increased further. Another interesting aspect is that anti-
populist features, which were scarce but present in the political
manifestos, disappeared in Abascal’s parliamentary interventions.
Although we acknowledge that additional research is required to
establish to what extent the discrepancies in salience of populist
dimensions between manifestos and parliamentary speeches are the
result of the specific communication context and medium—written
declaration of intentions vs oral parliamentary debate—, or the effect
of the crisis, these results corroborate the idea that populist discourses
are context-dependent (Ekström et al., 2018; De Bruycker and
Rooduijn, 2021). The lower density of populist features in
manifestos can be linked to the nature and length of the
document. Meanwhile, parliamentary interventions are time
limited and often politicians adopt a very direct style in which
they engage in a confrontational rhetoric to undermine the
credibility of their political adversaries, rather than trying to
elaborate on specific proposals about the organization of society
or decision-making.18
Another relevant feature is the almost complete absence of
references to populist sovereignty and leadership. While for other
PRRPs such as the Brexit Party, United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP) and Rassemblement National (RN–former National
Front) popular sovereignty is a core component of their discourse
(Olivas Osuna, 2020), in the case of VOX this is not a very
relevant feature. The lack of references to personalistic leadership
is not a surprise as usually manifestos in Spain focus on policy
proposals and the party leader is in theory only the first in a list of
many candidates.19 Similarly, parliamentary speeches are in
17Please note that in the literature anti-populism is sometimes used with a different
connotation, i.e., the recriminatory attitudes against populism (e.g., Stavrakakis,
2014; Stavrakakis et al., 2018; Panizza and Stavrakakis, 2021).
18Olivas Osuna (2019) demonstrates that the density of populist references is
considerably higher in short communications, such as press articles written by
populist leaders and short speeches, than in political manifestos.
19We have also found a scarcity to references to the personalistic leadership in the
analysis of the political manifestos of other PRRPs (Olivas Osuna, 2020) and in
those of Scottish National Party and Catalan pro-independence parties (Olivas
Osuna, 2019).
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theory focused on a specific topic, and leaders rarely speak about
themselves. More than emphasizing their own qualities they often
try to undermine those of their political opponents.
It is also important to note that populist features often
appeared combined. Antagonism and morality references tend
to intersect, especially in parliamentary speeches, as very often
Abascal used a confrontational and moral tone to criticize
political opponents. For instance, he states “[. . .] in this
political threat we cannot forget the usual traitors: the Catalan
separatists, who have even celebrated the epidemic (in Madrid)
with miserable jokes” (March 25, 2020), and “this is the difference
between this deputy (Abascal) and your Government, that I am
going to remain loyal to my oath to Spain, to the Constitution, to
the parliamentary monarchy and to the fundamental liberties that
the Government intends to crush” (April 22, 2020). Abascal
alludes to ill-intention of his adversaries and places them on a
lower rung of a moral hierarchy he establishes. Figures 2, 3 are
visual representations of the intersection of the coded segments in
the texts,—i.e., sentences allocated to more than one populist or
anti-populist dimensions (in parenthesis the total number of
coded segments, the thickness of lines is proportional to the
frequency of intersections).
On the other hand, Figure 4 shows the evolution of the density
(number of references per 1,000 words) of populist (left-hand
graph) and anti-populist (right-hand graph) features during the
six debates for the extension of the state of alarm. Both moralist
and antagonistic features, upward.
But not only the frequency of populist references soared, also
the tone and allusions became increasingly hyperbolic and
belligerent. For instance:
“Mr. Sánchez, you can’t disguise this: tens of thousands
of dead Spaniards due to sectarianism and criminal
negligence by this Government and millions of
Spaniards ruined . . . ” (Abascal, June 3, 2020) 20
“. . .We know where your Government stands, [. . .],
forging new agreements with all of Spain’s enemies . . . ,
of course: with ETA, with the Basque Nationalist Party
and with Republican Left of Catalonia, with those who
have only ever been concerned, are and will be
concerned by Spain going down in flames and who
have taken advantage of this epidemic to advance their
goals of destruction and division of Spain” (Abascal,
June 3, 2020)
FIGURE 1 | Aggregate levels of populism and anti-populism in the discourse and official VOX manifestos (coded segments/thousand words).
20Congress Sessions Report, http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L14/CONG/
DS/PL/DSCD-14-PL-25-C1.PDF
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“I believe that Mr Iglesias wishes a civil war, [. . .], I
believe that in his vanity and fanatism is capable of
provoking a tragedy in Spain, but we are not going to
fall into his provocations.” (Abascal, June 3, 2020)
Beyond attempts to undermine the political opponents, there
are very few references to specific aspects of COVID-19
pandemic. The strict lockdown measures imposed by the
government and supported by the majority of parties are
referred to as a “mass house arrest” (April 22, 2020). Abascal
argues that the “state of alarm” has been turned into a “state of
exception without limitation but suspension of fundamental
rights and liberties” (May 6, 2020). He accuses the
government of trying “to destroy the opposition, political
pluralism and fundamental rights, such as the right of
reunion” (May 6, 2020) with the pandemic policies. Abascal
requests the resignation of the Government for what he calls a
“criminal management which has brough economic ruin to
millions of Spaniards and death to thousands” (May 20, 2020).
Our findings suggest that VOX sensed the opportunity that the
pandemic presented and launched a fierce attack against the
Spanish government adopting a rhetoric of an anti-establishment
party (Magre et al., 2021).
The accusations against the Government of spreading
misinformation and hiding the facts were constant throughout
the pandemic period, as well as a noticeable change vis-à-vis
Abascal’s discourse during Pedro Sánchez investiture session in
January 2020 and the political manifestos of 2019. For example,
Abascal states: “we will not get out of this (referring to the crisis)
with the propaganda techniques of Mr. Maduro (Venezuelan
President) or the wisecracks of unscrupulous spin doctors”
(March 25, 2020); “the hoax Government has sent us today its
speakers, Mrs. Lastra, Mr. Echenique, and later Mr. Sánchez, to
spread fake news and lies” (April 9, 2020), and that the
Government is “hiding health information to the Spanish
people” (June 3, 2020). References to disinformation appear
intertwined with populist features. Some of the other common
themes in previous VOX communications, such as nationalist
FIGURE 2 | Intersection of codes in Abascal’s parliamentary speeches on the COVID19 state of alarm sessions.
FIGURE 3 | Intersection of codes in VOX′ political manifestos for 2019 European and Spanish General Elections.
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references, territorial issues, religion, and critiques to gender
discourses, although present in COVID-19 speeches, they lose
salience. The theme of immigration disappears in the
parliamentary speeches analyzed, despite being a core theme
in their manifestos. However, this does not mean that
migration was completely removed from VOX’s agenda as
migrants were later linked to the pandemic by other leaders of
the party.21 Figure 5 maps the codes Abascal’s speeches on the
pandemic debates, based on proximity in the text (one paragraph
distance).
Polarization can be instrumentalized in the process of
construction or reconstruction of a popular identity
(Mazzolini, 2021: 107). With transgressive crisis performances
and generic attacks based on moral considerations more than on
specific examples of mismanagement of the pandemic, Abascal
may have sought to delegitimize his political opponents and
promote a process of popular identification based on a logic of
equivalence (Ostiguy et al., 2021: 2; Laclau, 2005). This means
trying to develop a sense of unity among voters who share
different, but perceived as equivalent, grievances and negative
sentiments against the Government and the parties that support
it. Although some of these frustrations are originated by the
COVID-19 crisis itself, Abascal reinforces discontent by bundling
them with other political and social issues. Thus, crisis and
citizens’ grievances become co-constructed thanks to the
mediation of populist discourses (De Cleen et al., 2021: 158).
Polarization may be considered here a key element in the strategy
that tries to generate and capitalize on negative partisanship, i.e., a
process of political identification based on the antipathies toward
certain parties (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018).
Finally, we also analyze the speeches of the other five biggest
parliamentary groups PSOE, PP, UP, ERC, and Cs on the first,
March 25, 2020, and last debate on the state of alarm, June 3,
2020, to contextualize the level of populism of VOX and detect
possible spill-over effects on the discursive performance of
other leaders.22 The density of populist and anti-populist
features varies significantly across parties. Figure 6 displays
the aggregate levels of populism in their speakers’ speeches in
the first and last debate in the Congress of Deputies regarding
the state of alarm. In this very same line, Figure 7 disaggregates
populism into its dimensions. Both figures show significant
changes in the levels of populism in the interventions of
several other parties.
First, the speeches of PSOE and Cs contain a comparatively
very low density of populist references and a high level of anti-
populist features (mostly antagonism and sovereignty anti-
populism) in both sessions. Pedro Sánchez interventions were
FIGURE 4 | Evolution of populist and anti-populist discourse in VOX during the state of alarm.
21For instance, 20 minutos. 24 June 2020. “Vox acusa a las ONG que rescatan a los
inmigrantes de ‘matar a los españoles a base de infecciones’”: https://www.
20minutos.es/noticia/4303068/0/vox-acusa-ong-inmigrantes-matar-espanoles-a-
base-infecciones/
22It is worth noting that none of the parties voted against the first extension in
March but VOX, PP and ERC voted against the last one proposed by the
Government in June.
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long and most of them were focused on summarizing and
justifying the policies that his government was adopting.
Nonetheless, in his June speech Sánchez also directs several
moral attacks against Abascal and Casado in response to the
hard critiques from both leaders. The speakers of Cs, Edmundo
Bal and María Muñoz, expressed the will to collaborate with the
FIGURE 5 | Intersection of codes in Abascal’s parliamentary speeches on COVID19 state of alarm sessions.
FIGURE 6 | Aggregate levels of populism during the lockdown (March 25 and June 3, 2020).
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Government during the crisis and help implementing the
necessary reforms. As Sánchez, they make references to
dialogue and consensus building and the important role of
national and international institutions and laws. Bal’s speech
on June 3, 2020 contains a higher density of anti-populist features
than that of Muñoz in March. In this regard, the evolution of Cs
speeches is unique as all other parties display the opposite trend.
However, we cannot conclude that this responds to a party
communication strategy or simply to different communicative
styles between the two speakers.
Second, UP, despite being part of the government coalition
which had managed to secure great parliamentary support for the
extension of the state of alarm uses in both sessions a relatively
high level of populist references, the speakers of UP, Santiago
Romero and Jaume Asens, accuse the previous PP government of
undermining public services and thus increasing the pandemic
damage in Spain. Asens refers to these policies as “radical right
suicidal policies” and claims that VOX and PP are suggesting that
the Civil Guard and the Army should make a coup d’état against
the Government. He also accuses VOX of propagating hatred and
PP of ties with Francoism. Although the density of populist
references is overall lower in Asens’ speech the tone is more
belligerent than that of Romero. This more aggressive stance
could be also connected with the intensification of the populist
discourses of VOX and PP throughout the state of alarm period
or, as suggested above, to different discursive styles between the
two speakers of the coalition, who, in addition, belong to different
political parties (Asens belongs to UP Catalan brand, En Comú
Podem, and Romero belongs to United Left).
Third, during the session of the first extension in March, ERC’s
speaker, Gabriel Rufián, displayed a very low degree of populism and
devoted most of his speech to an agricultural policy which had been
discussed the same day. However, during the last extension session in
June, he significantly increased the number of antagonistic andmoral
references. Rufián directly criticizes Abascal’s speech and suggests
that despite having reached agreements with the left-wing
government during the state of alarm, “Ciudadanos is VOX in
phase 1” (June 3, 2020). Moreover, in a Manichean fashion he
ends up equating the right-wing political forces with fascism and
the left-wing parties with anti-fascism.
Finally, PP’s leader, Pablo Casado displays the most significative
change in discourse between the first and last state of alarm session.
Anti-populist features fall sharply, and populist ones increase
dramatically. Although it is not possible to establish a causal link,
there are some similarities between the discourses of Abascal and
Casado on June 3, 2020. Casado questions the legitimacy of Pedro
Sánchez, arguing that he is the President with less popular support in
history of democracy and that he relies on the support of ultra-left
and secessionist groups. He accuses Sánchez of purposefully
polarizing Spain and of “unstitching the Transition harmony”,
“endangering national unity”, abusing public institutions for his
political benefit, and being the less democratic and more radical
FIGURE 7 | Evolution of populist and anti-populist statements, major Spanish political parties (March 25 and June 3, 2020).
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of the governments of the Spanish democracy. Casado also claims
that Sánchez conceals the real number of COVID-19 casualties to
hide his incompetence and that he is undermining the economy amid
the crisis. Despite the strong moral criticisms and antagonistic stance
in his speech, Casado’s style is significantly less hyperbolic and coarse
than that of Abascal. Casado’s more confrontational and populist
discourse may be interpreted as an attempt to assert his role as
opposition leader. The initial moderate and supportive stance of PP
and Cs was utilized by VOX to stand out and try to capitalize on the
discontent of the people with lockdown measures and health crisis.
Our analysis shows that Abascal’s discursive style, matches
increasingly the characterization of populism by scholars in the
performative tradition, such as Ostiguy and Moffitt.23 The
communication strategy of the leader of VOX resonates with
(Moffit, 2015: 198–208) model of populist performances of crisis.
Abascal identified the Government’s failure to deal with the
pandemic and elevated the crisis by connecting it with a wider
moral interpretative framework, that also helped him depict the
Government as antagonistic to the Spanish people. He dramatized his
interventions aware that media would contribute to propagate his
inflammatory statements.24 Abascal also offered simple solutions to
complex problems and presented himself as a strong leader. He
organized a vote of no confidence and put himself forward as
candidate to replace Sánchez as President of the Spanish
Government. During the vote of no confidence, on October 21,
2020, he continued to perform the crisis with a similarly hyperbolic
style by claiming, for instance, that Sánchez’ government was “the
worst Government in the last eighty years” —which suggests that it
was worse than Francoist governments—and a “communist popular
front in alliance with separatists and terrorists”, in other words “a
Mafia” (Congreso de Diputados, 2020).25
Other leaders of VOX have also embraced an aggressive
performative style, distancing themselves from what is
politically correct emulating former United States President,
Donald Trump, and other international populist figures. For
example, during the vote of no confidence, VOX deputy
spokesperson, Ignacio Garriga, referred to “electoral fraud”,
accused the ruling coalition of “participating in a coup”, of
totalitarian ideology, of “criminal management” of the crisis.
He also used this speech to accuse “illegal immigrants” of
attacking, intimidating and stealing.26
Overall, the radicalization of VOX seems to have significantly
influenced the discourses of PP, that chose to follow the radical
right party stance in harshly criticising the government, as well as
the discourses of UP and ERC that reacted by also adopting a
confrontational and moral tone against both, VOX and PP. Even
Sánchez, whose discourse had a low density of populist features,
included several antagonistic and moral recriminations to the right-
wing leaders. For instance, he claims, “there is a difference betweenwho
fights against the virus and who uses the virus in bad faith to do
partisan politics, like Partido Popular and ultra-right VOX are doing”
(June 3, 2020).
This “action-reaction” dynamic gradually increased the overall level
of populist references in the parliamentary debates. Although VOX, a
populist party, led the utilization of a polarizing rhetoric in theCOVID-
19 pandemic context in Spain, other populist and non-populist parties
also embraced an antagonistic discursive logic. As our analysis shows,
the reactions and recriminations against populist leaders can
paradoxically contribute to make more pervasive the populist
frames and articulations (Stavrakakis, 2014: 508–512; Mudde and
Rovira-Kaltwasser, 2018: 1684). The denigration and stigmatization
of populist leaders help reify the Manichean division of the polity and
creates an opportunity for the instrumentalization of the narratives of
victimhood and humiliation to affectively anchor other populist claims
(Gerodimos, 2015; Homolar and Löfflmann, 2021).
Moreover, the discursive changes revealed in this study seem
to corroborate that communication styles are context-dependent
(Ekström et al., 2018; De Bruycker and Rooduijn, 2021). The
COVID-19 crisis, initially pushed most parties to adopt a
conciliatory tone. However, Abascal saw the opportunity to
make VOX stand out and spectacularize the crisis by adopting
an aggressive register. This shift in communication style then
triggered a sort of contagion effect in other parties, that also
modified theirs to confront and/or imitate Abascal. Further
research is necessary to investigate whether the populist
rhetoric was sustained throughout the entire pandemic27 and
to what extent polarized discursive performances of political
leaders are the cause of the very high levels of affective
polarization in the Spanish society (Gidron et al., 2020: 23)
and whether VOX manages to benefit electorally from them.
CONCLUSION
VOX is a young populist radical right party that has shown in the last
few years great capacity to adapt its discourse to surrounding events,
such as the political conflict inCatalonia and theCOVID-19pandemic.
VOX has transitioned from a traditionally conservative discourse to a
more aggressive populist one, with many similarities with other radical
right discourses in the United States and Europe. Santiago Abascal and
other VOX leaders adopt now a coarse and uninhibited style in their
communications. Their narratives oppose multiculturalism and
immigration and display frequent criticism against Islam. They
advocate for a centralized Spain without regional governments and
23For instance, Ostiguy (2009; 2017) defines populism as the “flaunting of the low”
and alludes to an antagonistic, uninhibited and coarse style adopted by populist
leaders (Ostiguy, 2009; 2017: 73–74, 79), and Moffitt defines populism as “a
political style that features an appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’, ‘bad manners’
and the performance of crisis, breakdown or threat” (Moffitt, 2016: 45).
24Many of Abascal controversial statements during these sessions were later
reflected in Spanish major newspapers, TVs and radio channels.
25Santiago Abascal’s speech on 21 October 2020 for the vote of no confidence. VOX
Youtube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?vpckbJrOq4QA




27It is worth noting that during the vote of no confidence session in the Congress,
Casado changed again his discourse and focused his criticisms on the threat of
Abascal and populism to democracy.
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impact on its discourses and, in general terms, on the Spanish
parliamentary debates.
The purpose of the article was not to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the ideology and policy proposals of VOX, but to assess
whether the COVID-19 crisis had a substantial impact on its
discourses and on Spanish parliamentary debates. This study has
explored empirically some theoretical arguments, such as whether
populist discourses are context dependent (Hawkins et al., 2019a; De
Bruycker and Rooduijn, 2021), the mutually constitutive relationship
between populism and crisis (Moffitt 2015), and the propagation
effect that populist performances have in non-populist parties
(Stavrakakis, 2014). To this end, we have conducted quantitative
and qualitative content analysis of two political manifestos and
seventeen parliamentary speeches using a new multidimensional
comparative framework for the study of populism (Olivas Osuna,
2021).
Our analysis suggests that the pandemic was seized by VOX as a
window of opportunity to adopt a highly antagonistic and moral
rhetoric to attempt to discredit the Government, gain visibility, and
harvest political support from dissatisfied citizens. We show that
Abascal consistently intensified the populist tone throughout the six
parliamentary debates on the extension of the state of alarm between
March and June 2020. Some of the usual themes in the manifestos of
VOX—such as calls for popular sovereignty, exclusionary idealization
of Spain, territorial issues, religion, and critiques to gender
discourses—lost weight and were replaced by direct attacks to the
government. This discursive shift away fromsomeof the core ideas that
VOX customarily emphasizes in its communications indicates that not
only ideology but also context and strategy inform populist discourses.
Abascal speeches tried to shape the interpretation of the crisis
in a Manichean fashion. The leader of VOX did not devote much
attention to the complexity of the situation, or the specific
measures taken in the fight against COVID-19, but largely
attempted to delegitimize his political opponents by accusing
them of disinformation and having hidden motives, such as
eroding the unity of Spain and trying to establish a
communist authoritarian regime. The use of bad manners and
the dramatization of the political crisis, with hyperbolic and
moralizing recriminations, fits with a populist polarizing
strategy that seeks to posit “the people” against ruling
coalition, and capitalize on discontent and negative partisanship.
Abascal’s discursive performance seems to have influenced
not only other leaders of VOX, who relied on hyperbolic
accusations to political opponents and conspiracy-based logic
during the rest of the pandemic, but also the speakers of
several other (populist and non-populist) parties. The leader
of PP, Casado, drastically modified his discourse between the
first and last COVID-19 debate. Anti-populist features were
abandoned and replaced by abundant populist antagonism
and morality features. Although the style of Casado was not as
emotional and aggressive as that of Abascal, the density of
populist references displayed was also very high and several of
the critiques were similar to those made by the leader of VOX.
The speakers of ERC and UP, parties who usually utilize
populist allusions in their communications, took advantage
of the excessive claims by Abascal to caricaturize and
delegitimize VOX as well as the other right-leaning parties
such as PP and Cs. Even Sánchez, who kept an institutional
somewhat neutral tone during most of the speeches analyzed,
used several antagonistic and moralistic arguments against
VOX and PP.
Our exploratory analysis suggests two mechanisms explaining
the propagation of the populist rhetoric in the Spanish Congress.
On the one hand, by hardening the attacks to the government,
populist parties may try to differentiate themselves from other
political forces and obtain more media attention, following a sort
of populist outbidding strategy. The newly acquired
disproportionate visibility may turn into increased support
from disenchanted citizens. The exaggeration and perpetuation
of the crisis become important instruments in the populist toolkit.
Other parties, such as PP in this case, may choose to also adopt a
populist rhetoric to avoid losing voters to more radical parties,
such as VOX. The recent regional elections in Catalonia—in
February 2021—, where PP adopted a moderate stance but was
largely beaten by VOX, may illustrate that maintaining a pluralist
discourse in the context of crisis and polarization can be
electorally damaging in the short-term.
On the other hand, parties from the other side of the political
spectrum, may also enter in a populist confrontation dynamic with
the party who escalated first. Once a party breaks implicit
conventions on what is acceptable to say in a parliament other
parties may follow. In the case of parliamentary debates concerning
the extension of the state of alarm in Spain, party speakers engaged in
aggressive attacks onto each otherwith hyperbolic accusations such as
suggesting that some parties were “euthanizing” part of the
population, calling for a military coup d’état, wishing a civil war,
or being fascists. The crossing of dialectic red lines in parliament
could be later reflected in a more aggressive tone and further
polarization in the public sphere.
Although a wider comparative analysis would be required to
confirm the magnitude and impact of the process of
intensification of populist rhetoric in the Spanish parliament
during the COVID-19 pandemic, our findings support the
argument that crisis can stimulate populism but also that
populists, via their communicative performances, construct or
reinforce crisis (Moffitt 2015). Similarly, our study has shown that
other parties react to these performances by also engaging in
blame attribution and moral condemnation contributing,
therefore, to normalize populist articulation and to propagate
or escalate the sense of crisis (Stavrakakis et al., 2018: 13).
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